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Although scholars have repeatedly touted the practical importance of being able to 
negotiate effectively across cultures, paradoxically, no study has directly addressed what 
predicts intercultural negotiation effectiveness. In this thesis, we examined the role of 
cultural intelligence (CQ) as a potential predictor of intercultural negotiation 
effectiveness. The negotiation transcripts of 124 American and East Asian negotiators (62 
dyads) were coded for joint sequencing of integrative behaviors as well as sequencing of 
cooperative relationship management behaviors. CQ measured a week prior to 
negotiations, and aggregated to the dyad level, predicted the extent to which negotiators 
sequenced integrative behaviors, which in turn predicted joint profit. CQ predicted 
integrative sequences over and beyond international experience, openness, extraversion, 
empathy, cognitive ability and emotional intelligence. Exploratory analyses revealed that 
the motivational facet of CQ had particularly strong predictive power, and that the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this era of globalization, it is critical that organizational researchers understand 
how culture influences negotiation behavior for both practice and theory. Negotiating 
effectively across cultures is a critical skill for businesspeople, as it is a crucial aspect of 
many inter-organizational relationships, including strategic alliances, joint ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions, licensing and distribution agreements, and sales of products 
and services (Adler, 2002; Cai & Drake, 1998). It is those people that understand how 
culture influences negotiation that will have a competitive advantage in today’s global 
marketplace (Gelfand & Christakopoulou, 1999). In addition to this practical concern, 
there is a theoretical impetus for culture and negotiation research. Historically, research 
in negotiation has tended to be largely culture-blind; it generally did not pay attention to 
the cultural context in which it was rooted. Furthermore, negotiation research has tended 
to be culture-bound, with many theories tested and developed only in Western cultural 
contexts (Berry, 1978; Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Smith & Bond, 1999). The field is 
increasingly recognizing that it is problematic to assume that negotiation theories and 
findings are universal when Western cultures only encompass approximately 30% of 
humankind (Triandis, 1994).  
Despite the importance of such pursuits, however, there is a fundamental paradox 
in the culture and negotiation literature. Even though the practicality of being able to 
negotiate effectively with people from different cultures is used to justify the need to 
develop cross-cultural theory, the vast majority of research remains comparative (Adler 
& Graham, 1989; Brett & Okumura, 1998). In other words, with some exceptions (Adair, 




Wilson, 2000; Natlandsmyr & Rognes, 1995), research focuses on comparing different 
negotiation behaviors across cultures, but of behaviors as they occur in mono-cultural 
settings, instead of directly examining intercultural settings where cultural barriers exist 
across the negotiation table. Implicit to this comparative approach is the researcher’s 
assumption that people behave similarly to other negotiators from foreign cultures as they 
do with those from their own culture, yet there is evidence showing this is not the case 
(e.g. Adair et al., 2001; Adler & Graham, 1989). If practice is to truly benefit from 
theory, more attention needs to be paid to intercultural negotiations. In reviewing the 
most recent and comprehensive handbook of negotiation and culture (Gelfand & Brett, 
2004), Kray (2005) observes, “although researchers have identified a host of cross-
cultural differences in styles and preferences, negotiation scholars might consider 
expanding beyond simple demonstrations of differences…and explore whether awareness 
of these differences makes a difference…knowledge about factors influencing the 
effectiveness of intercultural negotiations is sparse” (p.159). Indeed, as of yet, the culture 
and negotiation literature reveals little as to what characteristics negotiators can be 
selected and or trained upon in order to maximize the chances of reaching optimal 
agreements in negotiations that traverse cultural borders. 
As such, the focus of this study was to take an individual differences approach to 
see if a newly developed construct, cultural intelligence (CQ), defined as an individual’s 
capability to adapt effectively to situations of cultural diversity (Earley & Ang, 2003), 
predicts intercultural negotiation effectiveness, over and beyond other similar yet distinct 
interpersonal constructs including international experience (travel and living 




intelligence (emotional intelligence and cognitive ability). We reasoned that because CQ 
is a concept that specifically deals with a person’s skill level in overcoming cultural 
barriers, it holds promise as a useful predictor in the context of intercultural negotiations. 
More specifically, we examined whether intercultural dyads with higher CQ as compared 
with dyads with lower CQ would achieve higher negotiation outcomes, namely joint 
profit and relational capital (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O’Brien, 2006) by way of 
integrative sequencing of information behaviors as well as sequencing of cooperative 
relationship management behaviors. In addition, we explored the dyad composition of 
CQ, that is, whether it takes one or two high CQ negotiators to achieve such effective 
negotiation processes and outcomes. To the best of our knowledge, no other research has 
directly addressed our broader question, what predicts intercultural negotiation 
effectiveness? 
By examining intercultural negotiation “effectiveness” not only in terms of 
negotiation outcomes but also in terms of sequencing of behaviors that lead to these 
outcomes, we also make a contribution to the negotiation process literature in addition to 
the cross-cultural literature. We move beyond the predominant paradigm of just looking 
at the effects of an unexamined negotiation input, CQ, on negotiation outcomes 
(Weingart & Olekalns, 2004), but pay much-needed attention to the dynamic negotiation 
process through which CQ exerts its effects in intercultural contexts. 
In the following sections, we first review empirical findings from a handful of 
studies on intercultural negotiation that does exist in the literature, focusing on how and 
why bargaining in intercultural contexts are challenging. Second, we review the literature 




difficult to achieve but required for effective intercultural negotiation involves strategic 
sequencing of integrative information behaviors as well as cooperative relationship 
management behaviors. Finally, we discuss the construct of CQ, review empirical 
findings, and present our theory as to why CQ may improve intercultural negotiation 
effectiveness by way of sequencing integrative information behaviors as well as 
relationship management behaviors.  
Intercultural Negotiations: Why are they so Difficult? 
There are only a few studies in the culture and negotiation literature that directly 
examine negotiations in intercultural settings. A consistent finding from what evidence 
does exist, however, is that joint profit, or mutually beneficial outcomes are harder to 
achieve in intercultural than intracultural settings. For example, Adler & Graham (1989) 
found that joint profits were reduced for the Japanese when negotiating with Americans 
than when negotiating with other Japanese. Similarly, joint profits were lower for 
Anglophone Canadians when negotiating with Francophone Canadians than when 
negotiating within their own cultural group. Natlandsmyr & Rognes (1995) similarly 
found that intercultural groups of Mexicans and Norwegians achieved lower joint profit 
than intracultural groups of Norwegians. More recently, Brett and Okumura (1998) found 
that intercultural negotiations between U.S. and Japanese managers realized less joint 
gains than intracultural negotiations between Japanese managers or intracultural 
negotiations between American managers. Americans in particular had poor judgment 
accuracy of Japanese negotiators’ priorities of issues.  
Why is it that intercultural negotiators are less able to achieve mutually beneficial 




explanations can be identified in the literature. First, from a cognitive perspective, it 
seems that intercultural negotiators have difficulty developing a shared understanding of 
the task at hand. For example, Brett and Okumura (1998) argued that U.S. and Japanese 
negotiators bring different culture-specific schemas to the negotiation table which creates 
major communication inefficiency. Indeed, they found that American negotiators who 
value individualism had a higher self-interest schema than the Japanese who value 
collectivism, and Japanese negotiators who value hierarchy had a higher power schema 
than American negotiators who value egalitarianism. Similarly, Gelfand and McCusker 
(2002) argued that different culture-specific metaphoric mappings of the negotiation 
create different goals, scripts, and feelings in negotiation which makes it especially 
difficult to organize social action (Weick, 1979). For example, Americans operating 
under a sports metaphor may unconsciously assume that the goal of the negotiation is to 
conduct a performance contest, the script to emphasize aggressive behavior in which 
sportsmanship is expected, and feelings such as satisfaction to result from winning. In 
contrast, the Japanese operating under a household gathering metaphor may assume the 
goal of the negotiation is to ensure continuity and harmony of the group, the script to 
emphasize face-saving where aggression is eschewed, and feelings such as satisfaction to 
result from role fulfillment. Cai (1998) found empirical support for this notion 
specifically in terms of goals; U.S. negotiators focused more on achieving short-term, 
instrumental goals, whereas Taiwanese negotiators focused on long- term, global goals. 
In a laboratory study, Gelfand, Nishii, Godfrey, and Raver (2003) found that metaphoric 
similarity in negotiation was indeed an important predictor of joint gain. In so much as 




which intracultural negotiators do not face; that is, intercultural negotiators first need to 
“negotiate the negotiation”, or come to a shared understanding of what kind of task the 
negotiation situation is about in terms of goals, scripts, and feelings on top of addressing 
the actual negotiation issues themselves. 
Second, from a skill-based perspective, intercultural negotiators may lack the 
behavioral flexibility in overcoming their habitual, culturally normative behaviors, thus 
creating potential for misunderstanding. For example, from the Brett and Okumura 
(1998) dataset, Adair et al. (2001) found that American and Japanese negotiators use 
different normative types of integrative behaviors in order to create joint gain in their 
respective cultures. Americans, who come from a low-context culture normatively 
engaged in high frequencies of direct communication behaviors (e.g. priority 
information) where their intended meaning is explicitly portrayed in their messages that 
are spoken. The Japanese, however, who come from a high-context culture engaged in 
high frequencies of indirect communication behaviors (e.g. offers) in which the intended 
meaning is carried through the context of the messages given. The authors also found that 
in intercultural settings, the Japanese adapted their behaviors to the American direct 
approach, whereas Americans did not adapt and continued to use their habitual direct 
behaviors. Despite the Japanese negotiators’ efforts, however, Americans still had 
misunderstandings of their counterparts, as indicated by their use of repetitive, 
confirmatory, and clarifying questions. It is interesting to note looking across these two 
studies that even though Japanese intercultural negotiators had accurate understanding of 
their American counterparts’ issue priorities, as well as being able to behave the 




of joint profit as compared with American or Japanese intracultural negotiators. 
This leads to a third explanation for why intercultural negotiations are particularly 
difficult compared to intracultural negotiations. That is, motivation may be an additional 
factor that is necessary for integrative success. For example, it is possible that Japanese 
intercultural negotiators did not act on their judgment accuracy to create high joint gains 
because they were not as motivated as Japanese intracultural negotiators to reach 
integrative agreement (Adair et al. 2001). It is a well documented finding in social 
psychology that people are much more comfortable interacting with ingroup members 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Furthermore, incongruent cognitive structures and normative 
behaviors are more likely to make intercultural negotiations more stressful than 
intracultural negotiations (George, Jones, & Gonzalez, 1998; Kumar, 1999), making it 
especially difficult for intercultural negotiators to persist seeking integrative outcomes.   
Clearly, when bargaining across the cultural divide, negotiators experience 
considerable cognitive, motivational, and behavioral challenges which can impede the 
negotiation process, leading to suboptimal outcomes. Therefore, in trying to improve 
intercultural negotiation effectiveness, the two relevant questions are: What does an 
effective negotiation process look like, and what individual differences might help 
intercultural dyads to achieve this effective process? In the next section, we focus on the 
first question and review the U.S. literature on negotiation process to show that 
coordinated and synchronized behaviors that lead to optimal outcomes are reflected in 
certain types of strategic sequencing of negotiation behaviors. We then argue that in 
intercultural contexts, negotiators that are able to achieve high joint profit are those who 




cultural differences, through the use of integrative sequences of information behaviors as 
well as cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors. After the next 
section on negotiation process, we then explore CQ as a potential individual difference 
variable that may predict such sequences in intercultural negotiations. 
Negotiation Process: Strategic Sequences 
In the U.S. literature, the process of negotiation, or the ways in which negotiators 
exchange information through communication in their search for an agreement, has 
received considerably less research attention than have negotiation inputs (e.g. negotiator 
characteristics, styles, cognitions, motives) and outcomes of negotiation (e.g. individual 
and joint profits) (Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). However, there is wide agreement among 
researchers in this burgeoning literature that stable and organized social action between 
two negotiators is reflected in certain types of strategic sequencing of behaviors. Strategic 
sequences alter the context of the negotiation and shape the subsequent outcomes that are 
obtained (Brett, Shapiro, Lytle, 1998; Kelley, 1997; Neale & Northcraft, 1991; Putnam, 
1990; Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989). For example, reciprocal sequences refer to 
negotiators matching each other’s moves exactly (e.g. priority information eliciting 
priority information), and is interpreted as evidence that negotiators hold a high level of 
shared understanding of the negotiation task (Putnam, 1990; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). 
Reciprocal sequences of integrative behaviors in particular move the negotiation down a 
cooperative path increasing the likelihood of maximizing joint gain (Weingart & 
Olekalns, 2004). There is robust empirical evidence showing that reciprocating 
integrative tactics generate high joint outcomes (Adair, 2003; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; 




Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). Furthermore, complementary sequences refer to 
negotiators not matching each other’s moves exactly, but pairing similar tactics that have 
the same strategic focus, that is, tactics of either integrative or distributive categories. For 
example, priority information followed by a multi-issue offer has the same strategic focus 
of being integrative, yet is not identical. Adair and Brett (2005) and Adair et al. (2001) 
remarked that particularly in international negotiations, complementary sequences could 
also signal a shared cooperative understanding of the task, if parties enact integrative 
intentions but with different culturally normative kinds of behaviors. 
Clearly, sequencing integrative behaviors while negotiators maintain a mutually 
shared understanding of the negotiation as a cooperative problem-solving activity move 
them towards integrative agreements. However, particularly for intercultural negotiators, 
integrative sequences should be much more difficult to maintain, given the cognitive, 
behavioral, and motivational barriers discussed previously. For example, from a 
behavioral skill-based perspective, if a low-context American negotiator intends to be 
cooperative and directly asks his or her counterpart about issue priorities, and the high-
context Japanese negotiator also intends to be cooperative but indirectly answers with a 
multi-issue offer, the American not knowing how to correctly attribute meaning to the 
indirect behavior may misjudge that the Japanese negotiator is being competitive by 
avoiding the question and in turn, break the sequence of cooperative behaviors by 
responding negatively. Evidence for difficulties in synchronizing behaviors in 
intercultural contexts was indirectly found in Adair and Brett’s (2005) study where they 
observed that intercultural dyads took longer than intracultural dyads to reach stable 




cognitive structures is also an obstacle for maintaining sequences of integrative 
behaviors.  For example, if one negotiator implicitly focuses on short-term, instrumental 
goals whereas the other focuses on long-term, relational goals, the misalignment of the 
two goals should make synchronization of behaviors more difficult than when the goals 
are aligned. Finally, if negotiators lack the motivation or persistence in interacting with 
people from different cultures in the first place or easily becomes unmotivated because of 
cultural barriers, the already fragile process of sequencing behaviors becomes unlikely to 
occur.  
We argue then, that for intercultural negotiations to be effective, dyads would 
ideally consist of negotiators who have the capabilities in overcoming the cognitive, 
motivational, and behavioral hurdles mentioned above and are able to maintain 
sequencing of integrative behaviors. Furthermore, we argue that in addition to integrative 
sequences which focus on information exchange and is strictly task focused, effective 
intercultural negotiators would manage the relationship to maintain the fragile 
cooperative context and engage in sequences of cooperative relationship-focused 
comments throughout the negotiation (e.g. non task-focused expressions of enthusiasm 
for working together). Thus, in our study we focused on sequences of integrative 
information behaviors and sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors, 
which we expected to influence both objective and subjects aspects of negotiation 
outcomes. For negotiation outcomes, our main focus was on joint profit but we also 
examined relational capital (Gelfand et al., 2006), or the quality of the on-going 
relationship alongside joint profit. Subjectively measured outcomes such as relational 




effectiveness is both the cause and consequence of the working relationship (e.g. Allred, 
Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997; Gelfand et al., 2006; Greenhalgh & Kramer, 1990; 
Kramer & Messick, 1995). 
Below, we argue that CQ will predict both integrative sequences of information 
behaviors as well as cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors, which 
in turn will lead to joint profit and relational capital in intercultural negotiation (see figure 
1). Before we present our theory as to why CQ is beneficial, we will first discuss the 
construct of cultural intelligence in detail and review empirical findings on CQ in the 
next section. 
Cultural Intelligence 
Construct of CQ 
Cultural intelligence (CQ), defined as a person’s capability in successfully 
adapting to new cultural settings (Earley & Ang, 2003) was developed as a construct to 
address a question shared by many international HR managers: Why is it that some 
individuals who sometimes appear to be lacking social skills within their own culture 
adjust easily, quickly, and entirely to new cultures whereas other individuals, even those 
who possess high interpersonal skills within their own cultures, do not (Earley & Ang, 
2003)? In response to this need of understanding individual differences in cultural 
adaptation, Earley and Ang (2003) conceptualized CQ as a multi-faceted characteristic 
consisting of meta-cognitive, cognitive, motivational and behavioral components.  
The meta-cognitive facet of CQ refers to the level of cultural mindfulness during 
intercultural interactions (Ang, Van Dyne, & Koh, 2004). People who are high on meta-




cognitive processes engaged in learning about a new culture. In other words, individuals 
with high meta-cognitive CQ plan how to approach learning about the new culture, 
monitor their own comprehension, and evaluate their own progress towards 
comprehending the new culture. Meta-cognitive CQ is especially an important 
component of cultural intelligence for several reasons: 1) it promotes active thinking 
about people and situations in foreign cultural settings; 2) it prevents reliance on rigid, 
culturally bounded thinking and assumptions; and 3) it drives individuals to revise their 
strategies so that they are more likely to experience successful cross-cultural interactions 
(Ang et al., 2004). 
Whereas meta-cognitive CQ involves higher-level cognitive processes, cognitive 
CQ refers to acquired knowledge about a particular culture. This includes declarative 
knowledge, which refers to knowing about things such as a new culture’s economic, 
political, and legal systems, as well as procedural knowledge which refers to knowing 
how to do things within a new culture. Declarative knowledge can be acquired through 
observation or by directly asking host nationals, whereas procedural knowledge can be 
obtained through mimicry. Cognitive CQ is important for cultural intelligence because 
individuals can gain a better understanding of the systems that shape specific patterns of 
social interaction within a culture (Ang et al., 2004). 
Motivational CQ emphasizes a person’s values and self-efficacy in adapting to 
new cultures. Individuals with high motivational CQ are genuinely interested and are 
open to new cultural experiences. They are also highly self-efficacious about cross-
cultural interactions and strongly believe in their own ability to deal with different 




When individuals with high motivational CQ face obstacles or failures, they reengage 
with perseverance rather than withdrawing from the task.  Motivational CQ is important 
for cultural intelligence because it triggers effort and action as well as expanding and 
intensifying a person’s search for the best way to adapt to new cultural environments 
(Earley & Ang, 2003).  
Finally, behavioral CQ refers to the extent to which an individual acts 
appropriately, both verbally and non-verbally, in new cultural contexts (Ang et al., 2004). 
Individuals with high behavioral CQ are flexible and change their behaviors to meet the 
needs of a particular cultural situation. More specifically, they are sensitive to the range 
of behaviors that are enacted, the culture-specific display rules for nonverbal expressions, 
and the meanings that are attributed to certain non-verbal behaviors. Furthermore, 
knowing and wanting to elicit the right response is not enough for behavioral CQ; one 
must overcome already learned habits and elicit the appropriate response. 
Empirical Findings on CQ 
Given the infancy of the construct, empirical research on CQ is sparse, yet 
evidence for its predictive validity is growing. For example, in a series of studies, Ang, 
Van Dyne, Koh and Ng (2004) found that CQ significantly predicted task performance 
and adjustment in situations of cultural diversity among undergraduates, international 
executives, and foreign professionals. In one study, they gave undergraduates a cultural 
judgment and decision-making task where participants were required to read five cultural 
interaction scenarios and select the best response that explained the situation. Meta-
cognitive and cognitive CQ significantly predicted cultural judgment and decision-




In a second study, business executives of various nationalities participated in an 
executive development program on cultural intelligence. They were assigned to 
intercultural dyads and given an assignment where they were required to analyze a 
business scenario for developing a vacant piece of land in a culturally diverse part of 
Singapore. Their tasks consisted of convincing landowners that their plan had both 
marketing and financial viability. Each intercultural dyad wrote a business proposal and 
gave a presentation of their proposal at the end of the program. Peers rated each 
individual’s task performance. It was found that meta-cognitive and behavioral CQ 
predicted task performance, and motivational and behavioral CQ predicted general 
adjustment. 
In study three, foreign professionals completed an online survey on general, work, 
and interaction adjustment, and each professional’s supervisors rated his or her work 
performance. Meta-cognitive CQ and behavioral CQ predicted work performance while 
motivational and behavioral CQ predicted all three types of adjustment, over and beyond 
demographic characteristics. 
In another study, Templer, Tay, and Chandrasekar (2006) examined the utility of 
motivational CQ in predicting general and work adjustment over and beyond realistic job 
previews (RJP) and realistic living conditions previews (RLCP) among expatriates. As 
hypothesized, the authors found that motivational CQ was positively related to general 
and work adjustment over and beyond the two types of job previews as well as gender, 
age, time in host country, as well as prior international assignments.  
In sum, the predictive validity of CQ has been shown in many samples, (i.e. 




criteria (i.e. cultural judgment tasks, quality of business proposals developed through 
collaborative intercultural interaction, adjustment in foreign assignments), and over and 
beyond other constructs (i.e. demographics, intelligence, international experience). In the 
next section, we argue that CQ is also beneficial in the context of intercultural 
negotiations. 
Cultural Intelligence and Intercultural Negotiation Effectiveness 
Based on the previous discussion, we postulated that intercultural dyads with high 
CQ will be able to organize social action and engage in more sequences of integrative 
information behaviors and sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors, 
allowing them to achieve high negotiation outcomes compared with dyads with low CQ. 
Hypothesized effects are summarized in figure 1. 
Hypotheses: CQ and Strategic Sequences 
First, we expected that when dyads consist of individuals with high CQ, they will 
engage in more sequencing of integrative information exchange behaviors than when 
dyads consist of individuals with low CQ. Because high CQ individuals enjoy interacting 
with people from other cultures, they are more likely to adopt a cooperative approach to 
negotiating. In addition, high CQ individuals, with their meta-cognitive abilities are 
acutely aware that culture may cause potential misunderstandings in intercultural 
contexts. Thus, they will question their own cultural assumptions as well as draw on their 
existing knowledge of other cultures to try to understand their counterparts’ cultural 
assumptions. Furthermore, high CQ individuals possess a wider range of behaviors they 




intercultural negotiators out of sync. For example, using the previously mentioned 
example of a direct question about issue priorities being followed by an indirect multi-
issue offer, high CQ Americans are more likely to be able to recognize that people from 
high context cultures use indirect communication as a way to provide information and 
correctly attribute the indirect tactic as cooperative, as well as still being able to glean 
information that is present in the context of the messages given. Finally, high CQ 
individuals are more likely to persist even if the negotiation becomes stressful and 
difficult given their high motivation in intercultural situations. 
Thus, based on the previous discussion, we predicted that CQ predicts sequences 
of integrative information behaviors. We examined integrative sequences in two ways: 
reciprocal integrative sequences which occur when a certain negotiation tactic is 
followed by an identical negotiation tactic, and complementary integrative sequences 
which occur when a negotiation tactic is followed by a different negotiation tactic, but of 
the same general integrative information strategy. Furthermore, borrowing from Adair’s 
(2003) approach, we studied sequencing as they occurred at immediate and delayed time 
lags.  
H1. Dyads with higher CQ will engage in higher frequencies of immediate and/or 
delayed reciprocal sequences of integrative information behaviors than dyads 
with lower CQ. 
H2. Dyads with higher CQ will engage in higher frequencies of immediate and/or 
delayed complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors than 
dyads with lower CQ. 




that are task-focused, we expected dyads with high CQ to manage the relationship itself 
by engaging in more sequences of cooperative comments (e.g. expressions of enthusiasm 
for working together, cooperative acknowledgement of another’s perspective) that 
reinforce the cooperative context of the negotiation than dyads with low CQ. Although 
this type of sequencing has not been examined before in the literature, we expected it was 
another way in which high CQ individuals, who are conscious of potential cultural 
misunderstandings and stress that can arise out of intercultural interactions, to effectively 
buffer the negotiation. 
H3. Dyads with higher CQ will engage in higher frequencies of immediate and/or 
delayed cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors than dyads 
with lower CQ. 
Hypotheses: Strategic Sequences and Negotiation Outcomes 
In the negotiation process literature, it has generally been found that sequences of 
cooperative behaviors lead to joint profit (Adair, 2003; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; 
Weingart et al., 1999; Weingart & Olekalns, 2004; Weingart et al., 1990); however, most 
studies examining this relationship have been conducted in U.S. intracultural settings. 
Weingart and Olekalns (2004) argue that more research needs to examine the strategic 
sequence—outcome relationship as they occur in different negotiation contexts. Thus, in 
this study, we examine the relationship between strategic sequences and joint profit as 
they occur in the intercultural context. Based on the previous U.S. finding that generally, 
sequences of cooperative behaviors lead to joint profit, we predicted the following: 
H4. Dyads that engage in higher frequency of immediate and/or delayed 





H5. Dyads that engage in higher frequency of immediate and/or delayed 
complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors will achieve 
higher joint profit. 
H6. Dyads that engage in higher frequency of immediate and/or delayed 
cooperative sequences of relationship management-focused behaviors will 
achieve higher joint profit. 
Furthermore, alongside joint profit, we examined dyad-level relational capital, or 
what Gelfand et al. (2006) define as “the relational assets that accumulate within a 
specific dyadic negotiation relationship” (p.11), more specifically consisting of mutual 
liking, knowledge, trust, and commitment to continuing the relationship. Subjective 
outcomes such as relational capital are increasingly recognized by scholars as an 
important criterion since negotiation effectiveness is both the cause and consequence of 
the working relationship (e.g. Allred et al., 1997; Gelfand et al., 2006; Greenhalgh & 
Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Messick, 1995). We generally expected that intercultural dyads 
that engage in sequences of both integrative information behaviors as well as relationship 
management behaviors would gain higher relational capital.  
H7. Dyads that engage in higher frequency of immediate and/or delayed 
reciprocal sequences of integrative information behaviors will achieve higher 
relational capital. 
H8. Dyads that engage in higher frequency of immediate and/or delayed 
complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors will achieve 




H9. Dyads that engage in higher frequency of immediate and/or delayed 
cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors will achieve higher 
relational capital. 
Control Variables: Other Individual Difference Constructs 
In examining whether CQ predicts the above-mentioned sequences, we included 
other individual difference constructs as controls. Although there is no other empirical 
study linking other individual differences to strategic sequences, we felt it was important 
to control for them, given evidence of individual differences predicting integrative 
outcomes and that these effects may have been mediated by the sequencing of behaviors. 
For example, Barry and Friedman (1998) found that specifically in integrative 
bargaining, dyad-level cognitive ability predicted the level of joint gain. The authors also 
found that extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness did not help joint 
outcomes; however in a distributive bargaining context, extraversion and agreeableness 
were liabilities. Furthermore, Foo, Elfenbein, Tan, & Aik (2004) found that higher 
average emotional intelligence predicted better joint gain. Finally, Ma & Jaeger (2005) 
found that among Chinese negotiators, openness to experience was positively related to 
self-reported integrative behaviors and extraversion was positively related to both self-
reported integrative and competitive behaviors. Thus, in our study, we controlled for 
cognitive ability, emotional intelligence, openness to experience, extraversion, empathy, 
and international experience in testing whether CQ predicts sequences of integrative 
information behaviors and sequences of relationship management behaviors. Given that 
CQ specifically deals with overcoming cultural problems and is more conceptually 




constructs, we expected CQ to have predictive power over and beyond these other 
individual differences. In order to provide a strong test of CQ’s predictive power of 
strategic sequences over and beyond these other constructs, we included all six controls 
in our analyses. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 In addition to the hypothesized relationships, we examined two exploratory 
questions. First, although our theory was kept at the overall CQ level, we examined 
which of the four CQ facets influence sequences of integrative information behaviors and 
sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors. We were interested in 
exploring what specific facet could have more predictive power over others. For example, 
although having the ability to think meta-cognitively about culture, having extensive 
knowledge about other cultures, and being able to adapt behaviorally are most likely 
important in maintaining strategic sequences, it could be that these factors have little 
effect if the negotiators’ motivation to interact with people from different cultures is 
absent in the first place. 
 Second, we explored the effects of dyad composition of CQ on strategic 
sequences; that is, whether it takes one high CQ negotiator or two high CQ negotiators to 
have a positive impact on engaging in sequences of integrative information behaviors as 
well as relationship management behaviors. Given that strategic sequencing is a 
conjunctive task (Steiner, 1972) in which contributions from both negotiators are required 
for high performance, it is possible that a dyad’s level of strategic sequencing depends on 
the lowest level of CQ within the dyad, or in other words, the “weakest link”. That is, 




does not contribute to the joint activity of reciprocating integrative as well as cooperative 
behaviors, the dyad may still suffer as a result. Thus, in sum, we explored the effects of 
specific facets of CQ, as well as the dyad composition of CQ, on sequences of integrative 








Chapter 2: Method 
Participants 
 150 students (75 Americans and 75 East Asians) at both undergraduate and 
graduate levels were recruited through flyers, listservs, and newspaper advertisements at 
a large university in Maryland. For the American sample, the advertisement specifically 
targeted “American citizens of western European descent” and for the East Asian sample, 
those who have “lived in the U.S. for less than five years and are originally from China 
(including Taiwan), Japan, or Korea”. All students were given a $20 cash card for use at 
the campus bookstore for participation. The American sample consisted of 29 males and 
46 females, and the mean age was 26.9 years old. The East Asian sample consisted of 28 
males and 47 females, and the mean age was 26 years old. American and East Asian 
students were first matched on sex and level of education (graduate or undergraduate), 
and then randomly paired to form 75 intercultural negotiation dyads. Within the dyad, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two negotiator roles. 10 dyads had at least 
one member who did not give consent to the use of their digitally-recorded process data. 
Thus, 10 dyads were excluded from analyses with a final dyad-level sample size of 65, 
consisting of 130 individuals.  
Procedure 
 The study took part over two sessions, each session separated by a minimum of 
one week. On the first day, participants were asked to fill out an online questionnaire 
from home that assessed all individual difference characteristics, except for cognitive 




day, participants were asked to come into the laboratory to role-play a negotiation 
simulation. Participants first read their role and task information and filled out a pre-
negotiation planning sheet individually. After being reminded to take their negotiation 
roles seriously, participants were brought together with their partners from the other 
culture to role-play a 20-minute negotiation while being digitally tape-recorded. At 15 
minutes into the negotiation, participants were given a reminder that there were five 
minutes remaining. After the negotiation session, both negotiators filled out a final 
agreement form that indicated the level of settlement reached for each negotiation issue. 
Negotiators were then separated to fill out a post-negotiation questionnaire that assessed 
subjective negotiation outcomes. After filling out the post- negotiation questionnaire, 
participants were timed for 12 minutes to complete a test of cognitive ability. Finally, 
participants were fully debriefed on the purpose of the study. 
Negotiation Task 
 The negotiation simulation was adapted from Towers Market II, used in previous 
research on integrative bargaining (Weingart, Olekalns, & Smith, 2004), and involved 
one participant playing the role of a specialty grocery shop owner, and the other 
participant playing the role of a specialty wine shop owner. Participants were told that a 
successful real estate company has proposed developing a multifunctional market that 
consists of a wine store and a grocery store under one roof with common décor but with 
separate areas for their respective top-quality products. Participants were told that they 
were seriously interested in the shared market but needed to negotiate five unresolved 
issues with the other vendor: 1) Hours of Operation, 2) Renovation Costs, 3) Floor 




   Each participant was given role instructions that included a payoff schedule that 
listed the five possible levels of settlement on each of the five negotiation issues and the 
number of points associated with each level of settlement within an issue. Points 
indicated the amount of worth of that level of settlement to the negotiator (see table 1). 
Depending on which negotiation role the participant played, different negotiation issues 
were most important and least important to the negotiator. For example, for the grocery 
shop owner, the most important issue was the Grand Opening Date (with the best 
settlement option September 1 worth 400 points), whereas for the wine shop owner, the 
most important issue was the Renovation Cost (with the best settlement option $30,000 
also worth 400 points). Thus, negotiation issues Grand Opening Date and Renovation 
Cost were integrative issues where negotiators could identify differences in priorities and 
make tradeoffs. Hours of Operation and Temperature were distributive issues in which 
the payoff for one negotiator was diametrically opposite of the other negotiator, and Floor 
Space was a compatible issue where the payoff structure was identical for both 
negotiators. In order to ensure that participants understood the payoff schedule, a quiz 
was included in the role instructions which asked participants to calculate the total 
number of points that would be gained given a specific settlement across the five issues. 
If participants got the answer incorrect, they were asked to review the task instructions 
again.  
Coding of Negotiation Behaviors at the Tactical Level 
Coding Scheme 
Process data from the digital tape-recordings of negotiation sessions were 




Weingart and colleagues for their Towers Market II negotiation simulation (cf. Weingart 
et al., 2004; see appendix A for 37 tactic codes and definitions).  
Coding Process 
After all of the process data had been transcribed, the negotiation dialogue was 
unitized and coded at the thought-unit level, where a thought-unit refers to one thought or 
idea which roughly corresponds to a sentence. Through multiple half-day practice 
sessions, three research assistants were trained on how to unitize the negotiation dialogue 
into thought units. Initial practice sessions were conducted as a group in order for 
research assistants to develop a collective understanding of how to deal with difficult 
cases such as when one thought unit was expressed repeatedly in multiple sentences, as 
well as when multiple thought units were expressed within one sentence. Research 
assistants were trained until they reached a high level of unitizing reliability then unitized 
their own batch of transcripts. Three full transcripts were randomly chosen for all 
research assistants to unitize before each unitized their own batch. Between all pairs of 
research assistants, Guetzkow’s U (Guetzkow, 1950) was calculated, which is the 
difference between the number of units identified by an independent coder and the “true” 
number of units (i.e. the average of the two coders’ estimates).  The average Guetzkow’s 
U between all pairs of research assistants, for any one of the three full transcripts was 
under 0.06, indicating high unitizing reliability (Guetzkow, 1950). 
 Once all process data had been unitized, two coders blind to all research 
hypotheses content-coded the negotiation transcripts at the tactical level. Again, coders 
were trained through multiple half-day practice sessions, this time specifically on how to 




their own, and then compared their answers in order to resolve disagreements and 
develop a collective understanding of each tactical code. At the end of the practice 
sessions, the two research assistants coded three randomly drawn full transcripts. The 
average inter-rater reliability of the three transcripts was high, with Cohen’s K = 0.88. 1  
Operationalizing Frequencies of Strategic Sequences: Sequences of Integrative 
Information Behaviors and Sequence of Cooperative Relationship Management 
Behaviors 
Grouping of Negotiation Tactics into Strategic Clusters 
Once all negotiation behaviors for each speaking turn within a dyad were coded at 
the tactical level as listed in appendix A (e.g. states preference within a single issue, 
states priority information across two or more issues, etc.), all 37 negotiation tactics were 
conceptually grouped into strategic clusters, which was the level of abstraction in which 
strategic sequences were defined (see below for details). First, the strategic cluster of 
integrative information included the following negotiation tactics: a) states preference 
within a single issue, b) states priority information across two or more issues, c) asks a 
question about other’s issue preference, d) asks a question about other’s priority across 
two or more issues, e) notes issue difference with sympathy, f) notes similarity in issue 
preference or priority, g) suggests compromise or willingness to concede, h) suggests 
package tradeoff of two or more issues, i) expresses positive reaction to issues, j) makes 
multi-issue offer, and k) suggests reciprocity. We conceptualized integrative information 
more broadly than is typically done in U.S. negotiation research which focuses primarily 
on direct ways of conveying information (i.e. statements and questions about issue 




integrative tactics that allowed for more indirect ways of conveying information which is 
more common in East Asian cultures (Adair et al., 2001; Adair, 2003; Adair & Brett, 
2005). We reasoned that in intercultural contexts, it is more realistic that high CQ 
negotiators would use a wider repertoire of behaviors in exchanging information than 
solely relying on direct behaviors that are normative in the U.S. Thus, in examining 
integrative processes, it is important to not only include Western derived measures of 
integration but also Eastern derived measures of integration, lest the measure be biased. 
Thus, we also included the following tactics as integrative information: suggests 
compromise or willingness to concede; suggests package tradeoff of two or more issues; 
expresses positive reaction to issues; makes multi-issue offers; and suggests reciprocity, 
as they all convey information about one’s issue preferences or priorities in an indirect, 
implicit way. 
Second, in order to examine the negotiation process in terms of not only task-
focused integrative information behaviors but of how negotiators manage their 
relationships with each other, we added the strategic cluster of cooperative relationship 
management, which included the following negotiation tactics: a) makes off-task 
comments about cooperation, b) notes mutual interdependence, and c) comments that 
validate other’s perspective. Finally, other negotiation tactics were also grouped into 
strategy clusters of distributive information and competitive non-information (see 
appendix A); however, given that there were no significant results on these variables, 
they will not be discussed further.  
Definition of Sequence of Integrative Information Behaviors: Reciprocal and Complementary. 




negotiation tactic falling within the strategy cluster of integrative information (elicited by 
negotiator 1), was followed by another negotiation tactic also falling within the strategy 
cluster of integrative information (elicited by negotiator 2). As previously mentioned, 
sequences of integrative information behaviors were examined in two ways: 1) reciprocal 
sequences of integrative information behaviors and 2) complementary sequences of 
integrative information behaviors (Weingart & Olekalns, 2004). A reciprocal sequence 
of integrative information behaviors occurred when the two negotiation tactics 
comprising the sequence were identical (e.g. negotiator 1 states issue preference  
negotiator 2 states issue preference). For each dyad, reciprocal sequences for each 
negotiation tactic within the integrative information strategy were counted and summed 
to give an overall count of reciprocal sequences across all tactic types. A complementary 
sequence of integrative information behaviors occurred when the two negotiation tactics 
comprising the sequence were not identical (e.g. negotiator 1 asks a question about 
other’s priority across two or more issues  negotiator 2 states priority information 
across two or more issues), but were of the same integrative information strategy. In sum, 
both reciprocal and complementary sequences involve sequences of negotiation tactics 
that fall under the integrative information strategy cluster. However, reciprocal sequences 
involve two identical negotiation tactics whereas complementary sequences involve two 
different negotiation tactics.  
Definition of Sequences of Cooperative Relationship Management Behaviors 
Sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors occurred when any 
negotiation tactic falling within the strategic cluster of cooperative relationship 




within the strategic cluster of cooperative relationship management (elicited by 
negotiator 2). An example is when negotiator 1 makes a miscellaneous cooperative 
comment and is followed by negotiator 2 also making a miscellaneous cooperative 
comment.  
Counting Sequences at Immediate and Delayed Time Lags 
In determining the frequency of each type of sequences for all dyads, reciprocal 
sequences of integrative information behaviors, complementary sequences of integrative 
information behaviors, and sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors 
were all counted at immediate and delayed time lags, as done by previous research 
(Adair, 2003; Adair & Brett, 2004). Immediate time lags occurred when the tactic elicited 
by negotiator 1 is immediately followed in the next speaking turn by the tactic elicited by 
negotiator 2. Delayed time lags occurred when the tactic elicited by negotiator 1 is 
followed three speaking turns afterwards by the tactic elicited by negotiator 2.  
As an illustration, suppose C represents a cooperative relationship management 
tactic, O represents some other tactic, and the subscripts one and two represent the 
negotiator within the dyad. If we are interested in counting the number of immediate 
cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors, the negotiation pattern of 
C1C2O1C2O1 has one immediate cooperative sequence of relationship management 
behaviors among four total sequences at the immediate time lag (i.e. C1C2, C2O1, O1C2, 
C2O1). However in counting the number of delayed cooperative sequences of relationship 
management behaviors, the same negotiation pattern would also count one delayed 
cooperative sequence of relationship management behaviors, this time between two total 




frequencies were counted for reciprocal sequences of integrative information behaviors, 
complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors, and cooperative 
sequences of relationship management behaviors at both immediate and delayed time 
lags. This was done automatically for each dyad, using Bakeman and Quera’s (1995) 
General Sequential Querier software program.  
To control for the total number of speaking turns across dyads (i.e. the length of 
the negotiation), the raw frequencies for each type of strategic sequence was converted 
into relative frequencies (c.f. Adair, 2003; Adair & Brett, 2005). More specifically, the 
raw frequency of immediate strategic sequences was divided by the dyad’s total number 
of speaking turns – 1, whereas the raw frequency of delayed strategic sequences was 
divided by the dyad’s total number of speaking turns – 3. Because small proportions can 
pose statistical challenges, the relative frequencies were then logit-transformed to stretch 
the tails of the distribution as recommended by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003).  
Examining the Latter Two-Thirds of the Negotiation Transcript 
Given that it takes time for negotiators’ patterned behaviors such as strategic 
sequences to emerge, especially in intercultural contexts (Adair & Brett, 2004; 2005), and 
that it also takes time for individual differences to surface and impact social integration in 
group contexts (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey 2002), we examined whether CQ 
predicts integrative and relationship management sequences at the latter two-thirds of the 
negotiation. Borrowing Adair and Brett’s (2005) approach, we divided each dyad’s full 
transcript into thirds based on the total number of speaking turns, and counted the relative 
frequencies of each type of strategic sequence as they occurred in the latter two-thirds of 




sequences that occurred in the full negotiation; however, results were stronger focusing 
on the latter two-thirds of the negotiation. Thus, we present the results for the full 
negotiation for the interested reader in appendix B; however, we focus our analyses and 
discussion looking at the latter two-thirds of the negotiation. 
Individual Difference Measures 
Cultural Intelligence (CQ) 
 CQ was assessed using a 20-item four-factor measure developed by Ang et al. 
(2004, see appendix C for items), and used by others for empirical research (Ang, Van 
Dyne, & Koh, 2006; Templer et al., 2006). Evidence for factor equivalence in two 
samples (Singapore and U.S.), acceptable reliability, temporal stability, and cross-
validation for the measure can be found in a series of studies conducted by the authors.  
Ang et al. (2004) first generated a pool of 53 items based on the cross-cultural 
adjustment literature and interviews with eight executives with extensive international 
work experience. Three researchers and three other international executives with cross-
cultural expertise then independently assessed the items for relevance, clarity, and 
fidelity. They also rated each item for consistency with definitions of the four factors of 
CQ. For each factor, 10 best items were retained, forming the initial 40-item CQ scale. 
Next, 576 undergraduate students in Singapore completed the 40-item CQ scale. 
Principle axis factor analysis with varimax rotation demonstrated factor loadings for 24 
items in four primary factors with 62.9% of overall variance explained. Confirmatory 
factor analysis using a second sample of Singaporean undergraduate students 
demonstrated that the 24-item measure had moderate fit, but a 20-item measure, used in 




acceptable in Ang et al.’s (2004) sample: αMeta-cognitive = 0.76 for four items, αCognitive = 
0.84 for six items, αMotivational = 0.77 for five items, and αBehavioral = 0.84 for five items. In 
addition, the authors examined the temporal stability of the CQ scale. Participants 
completed the 20-item CQ scale for the second time four months after the first 
assessment, and results showed factor invariance across time. Finally, for cross-
validation, Ang et al. had 337 American undergraduates complete the 20-item CQ 
measure and found strong support for invariance in factor structure, factor loadings, and 
factor covariances across the U.S. and Singapore. In a separate study examining the 
personality antecedents of CQ, Ang et al. (2006) replicated these results providing 
additional evidence for the four-factor model of CQ. 
In the present study, overall CQ had high reliability (αAmerican = 0.90; αEast Asian = 
0.86). Example items include “I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-
cultural interactions” for meta-cognitive CQ (four items; αAmerican = 0.84, αEast Asian = 0.83 
), “I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures” for cognitive CQ (six items; 
αAmerican = 0.80, αEast Asian = 0.78), “I enjoy interacting with people from different 
cultures” for motivational CQ (five items; αAmerican = 0.86, αEast Asian = 0.70), and “I 
change my verbal behavior when a cross-cultural interaction requires it” for behavioral 
CQ (five items; αAmerican = 0.87, αEast Asian = 0.77), to which participants indicated their 
extent of agreement from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”.  
 Furthermore, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used to confirm the 
dimensionality of the 20 CQ items from Ang et al.’s (2004) scale. Given that individual 
items tend to have low reliabilities and often violate assumptions of multivariate 




indicators instead of individual items (Bandalos, 2002; Nasser & Wisenbaker, 2003). In 
order to create parcels, for each CQ facet, exploratory factor analysis was conducted with 
maximum likelihood estimation specifying one factor, in order to identify items with high 
factor loadings and lower factor loadings. For meta-cognitive CQ with a total of four 
items, two parcels were created with two items each, each parcel being the average of an 
item with a higher factor loading and an item with a lower factor loading. Similarly for 
cognitive CQ with a total of six items, three parcels were created with two items each. 
For motivational and behavioral CQ with a total of five items respectively, three parcels 
were created with two items each, but the third parcel representing the one item with the 
median factor loading. Specifying a model where the parcels load onto relevant CQ 
facets, and where all CQ facets load onto overall CQ, the overall fit of the model was 
good (χ2 [40] = 73.46, p = 0.00; CFI = 0.95; SRMR = 0.08; RMSEA = 0.08). 
International Experience 
 Both international travel experiences and international living experiences were 
measured. Borrowing from Takeuchi, Tesluk, Yun, and Lepak (2005), participants were 
asked to list, in chronological order from most recent to least recent, the countries and 
duration of each type of international experience that that they considered important. All 
travel and international experiences were summed respectively, and converted to weeks.  
Openness to Experience 
 Openness to experience was measured with 10 items from Goldberg’s short 
version of the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP, 2006). An example item is, “I 




“very inaccurate” to (5) “very accurate” scale.  
Extraversion 
 Extraversion was also measured with 10 items from Goldberg’s short version of 
the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP, 2006). An example item is, “I am the life of 
the party” (αAmerican = 0.88, αEast Asian = 0.89). 
Empathy 
 Empathy was measured with Davis’ Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, 1983), 
consisting of 28 items (αAmerican = 0.78, αEast Asian = 0.77). Participants’ responses were 
made on a five-point scale ranging from (0) “does not describe me well” to (4) “describes 
me well”. An example item includes, “I believe that there are two sides to every question 
and try to look at them both.” 
Emotional Intelligence 
Emotional intelligence was measured using Schutte et al.’s (1998) 33-item scale 
that was developed based on Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) conceptualization of the 
construct (αAmerican = 0.87; αEast Asian = 0.91). An example item is “When I experience a 
positive emotion, I know how to make it last”, and was administered on scale from (1) 
“strongly disagree” to (5) “strongly agree”.  
Cognitive Ability 
 Cognitive ability was measured using the Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT, 2000), 
a 12-minute speed test consisting of 50 questions that assesses an individual’s math and 






 Joint profit was measured summing the total number of points in the payoff 
schedule earned by both negotiators within a dyad. 
Relational Capital 
 Relational capital (Gelfand et al., 2006) was measured with 12 items written for 
this study, tapping negotiators’ mutual liking, trust, understanding, and commitment to 
their future relationship (see appendix D; αAmerican = 0.88, αEast Asian = 0.91). 
Demographics 
 Five demographic variables were measured at the dyad-level: dyad sex (1=female, 
2=male), dyad level of education (1=undergraduate, 2=graduate), dyad mean age (years), 





   
 
 




Chapter 3: Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
 All individual difference scores and relational capital scores were aggregated to 
the dyad-level by averaging the two negotiators’ scores. Means, standard deviations, and 
dyad-level inter-correlations for the individual difference measures, strategic sequences, 
outcomes, as well as demographic variables are shown in table 2. None of the 
demographic variables were significantly correlated with negotiation processes or 
outcomes, except for dyad sex and joint profit (r (62) = 0.35, p < 0.01), where male dyads 
achieved higher joint profit than female dyads. In terms of individual differences and 
strategic sequences, there were a number of notable significant correlations: CQ and 
immediate complementary sequences of integrative behaviors (r (65) = 0.32, p < 0.05), 
CQ and delayed complementary sequences of integrative behaviors (r (65) = 0.31, p < 
0.05), openness and immediate reciprocal sequences of integrative behaviors (r (65) = 
0.32, p < 0.05), and emotional intelligence and immediate complementary sequences of 
integrative behaviors (r (65) = 0.25, p < 0.05).  
Tests of Hypotheses Using Multiple Regression 
All hypotheses, each representing a path in the model in figure 1, were tested 
using multiple regressions. Subsequently, a post-hoc path model was fit based on 
significant regression paths found (see below).  
Overall CQ and Negotiation Process 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that dyads with higher overall CQ will engage in more 




behaviors than dyads with lower overall CQ, over and beyond international experience 
(i.e. travel and living experiences), personality (i.e. openness, extraversion, empathy) and 
intelligence constructs (i.e. emotional intelligence and cognitive ability). The results in 
table 3 show that overall CQ did not significantly predict reciprocal sequences of 
integrative information behaviors at immediate (β = 0.08, p > 0.60) or delayed time lags 
(β = 0.18, p > 0.15). Thus, hypothesis 1 was not supported.  
 Hypothesis 2 predicted that dyads with higher overall CQ will engage in more 
immediate and/or delayed complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors 
than dyads with lower overall CQ, over and beyond international experience (i.e. travel 
and living experiences), personality (i.e. openness, extraversion, empathy) and 
intelligence constructs (i.e. emotional intelligence and cognitive ability). Table 4 shows 
that dyad overall CQ did predict reciprocation of complementary integrative behaviors at 
immediate (β = 0.32, p < 0.05) and delayed (β = 0.33, p < 0.05) time lags. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 was supported. 
 Hypothesis 3 predicted that dyads with higher overall CQ will engage in more 
immediate and/or delayed cooperative sequences of relationship management-focused 
behaviors than dyads with lower overall CQ, over and beyond international experience 
(i.e. travel and living experiences), personality (i.e. openness, extraversion, empathy) and 
intelligence constructs (i.e. emotional intelligence and cognitive ability). Table 5 shows 
that dyad overall CQ is not significantly related to the reciprocation of cooperative 
relationship management-focused behaviors at immediate (β = 0.22, p > 0.10) or delayed 




Negotiation Process and Outcomes 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that immediate and/or delayed reciprocal sequences of 
integrative information behaviors would be positively related to joint profit. Having 
included reciprocal, complementary, and cooperative relationship management sequences 
in the regression equation, table 6 shows that there was no significant relationship 
between reciprocal sequences and joint profit at immediate (β = 0.05, p > 0.70) or 
delayed (β = 0.14, p > 0.30) time lags. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. Hypothesis 
5 predicted that immediate and/or delayed complementary sequences of integrative 
information behaviors would be positively related to joint profit. There was a positive 
significant relationship at the immediate time lag (β = 0.30, p < 0.05). Thus, hypothesis 5 
was supported. Hypothesis 6 predicted a positive relationship between immediate and/or 
delayed cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors and joint profit. 
Hypothesis 6 was not supported as there were no significant relationships at the 
immediate lag (β = 0.12, p > 0.30) or delayed lag (β= 0.09, p > 0.40).  
 Hypothesis 7 predicted that immediate and/or delayed reciprocal sequences of 
integrative information behaviors would have a positive effect on relational capital. Table 
7 shows that having entered sequences of reciprocal, complementary, and cooperative 
relationship management behaviors together into the regression equation, reciprocal 
sequences did not predict relational capital at immediate (β = 0.14, p > 0.2) or delayed (β 
= -0.07, p > 0.50) time lags. Thus, hypothesis 7 was not supported. Hypothesis 8 
predicted that immediate and/or delayed complementary sequences of integrative 
behaviors would have a positive effect on relational capital. There was no significant 




Thus, hypothesis 8 was not supported. Finally, hypothesis 9 predicted that immediate 
and/or delayed cooperative sequences of relationship management behaviors have a 
positive effect on relational capital. Hypothesis 9 was supported as there were significant 
effects at both immediate time lags (β= 0.42, p < 0.01), and delayed time lags (β= 0.33, p 
< 0.01). In sum, the regression coefficients from the multiple regression results for the 
hypothesized model is shown in figure 2 (immediate time lag) and figure 3 (delayed time 
lag). 
Post-hoc Model Modification and Overall Fit 
 Based on the significant regression coefficients found in figure 1, the overall fit of 
a simplified model (figure 4) was assessed using path modeling (cf. Schneider, Ehrhart, 
Mayer, Saltz, & Niles-Jolly, 2005). We used the path model approach instead of the 
traditional Baron and Kenny test of mediation (1986) since the initial variable CQ, and 
the outcome variable, joint profit, were not significantly correlated. Establishing such a 
bivariate relationship between the initial variable and the outcome variable is the first 
step in establishing mediation in Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach. However, as 
argued in Schneider et al. (2005), a number of scholars have questioned whether it is 
necessary to provide evidence for the first step to establish mediation (Collins, Graham, 
& Flaherty, 1998; MacKinnon, 2000; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000; Shrout & 
Bolger, 2002), when the crucial steps are establishing the relationship between the initial 
variable and the mediator, and the relationship between the mediator and outcome 
variable (Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998). Furthermore, MacKinnon, Lockwood, 
Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002) argued that a simultaneous test of significance of the 




(i.e. path modeling), relative to other approaches (such as Baron and Kenny’s test) 
provides the best balance of type I error rates and statistical power.  
In the post-hoc path model, including all control variables would have created too 
large a model to test given the small sample size. Thus, it was necessary to first partial 
the influences of the covariates from all model variables. Recent simulation studies have 
demonstrated the appropriateness of this practice, as structural coefficients were found to 
be virtually equivalent, whether the researcher directly models the covariates, or employs 
SEM using partial covariances (Fletcher, Germano, & Selgrade, 2006; Kammeyer-
Mueller & Wanberg, 2003; Newcomb & Bentler, 1988). Partial covariances in this study 
were created by regressing the model indicators (CQ, immediate complementary 
sequences of integrative information behaviors, and joint profit) onto all covariates (i.e. 
travel experience, living experience, openness, extraversion, empathy, emotional 
intelligence, and cognitive ability) individually and then saving the residual covariances. 
The simplified model fit the data well (χ2 [1] = 1.33, p = 0.25; CFI = 0.97; SRMR = 
0.054; RMSEA = 0.073). Estimated path coefficients are found in figure 4. Thus, results 
show that higher the CQ, dyads engage in more sequences of complementary integrative 
information behaviors, which in turn leads to high joint profits.  
Exploratory Analyses 
CQ Facets 
 Do specific CQ facets predict strategic sequences? We conducted additional, 
multiple regression analyses to address this issue, entering all four CQ facets and all 




CQ increased reciprocal sequences of integrative information behaviors (β = 0.42, p < 
0.05). For complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors, motivational 
CQ was found to drive the significant overall CQ effect (β = 0.42, p < 0.01). 
Furthermore, behavioral CQ was found to increase reciprocity of cooperative relationship 
management-focused behaviors (β = 0.36, p < 0.05). At delayed time lags, cognitive CQ 
had a marginally significant, positive relationship with complementary sequences of 
integrative information behaviors (β = 0.25, p < 0.10). There were no significant effects 
between CQ facets and delayed reciprocal sequences of integrative information 
behaviors, nor delayed cooperative sequences of relationship management-focused 
behaviors. Figure 5 presents overall significant results for CQ facets predicting strategic 
sequences at the immediate time lag. Based on significant paths found in figure 5, we 
assessed the overall fit of a simplified SEM model including meta-cognitive CQ, 
motivational CQ, behavioral CQ, immediate reciprocal sequences of integrative 
information behaviors, immediate complementary sequences of integrative information 
behaviors, immediate cooperative sequences of relationship management-focused 
behaviors, joint profit, and relational capital. The simplified model fit the data well (χ2 
[17] = 13.74, p = 0.69; CFI = 1.00; SRMR = 0.08; RMSEA = 0.00). Estimated path 
coefficients are found in figure 6. 
Dyad Composition 
 Does it take one or two negotiator(s) for CQ to be advantageous in increasing 
sequences of reciprocal/ complementary integrative information behaviors as well as 
sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors? We first addressed this 




the lower of the two negotiators’ overall CQ score) and each type of behavioral sequence 
at immediate and delayed time lags. For minimum overall CQ, the pattern of results was 
almost identical to those obtained with overall mean CQ. Minimum overall CQ did not 
predict reciprocal sequences of integrative information behaviors (βimmediate= 0.16, p > 
0.20; βdelayed= 0.20, p > 0.15). However, it did have a significant positive relationship 
with complementary sequences of integrative information behaviors (βimmediate= 0.32, p < 
0.05; βdelayed= 0.39, p = 0.01). Thus, this result suggests that the extent to which dyads 
engage in complementary sequences of integrative behaviors is only as good as its lowest 
CQ negotiator.  
Finally, minimum overall CQ did not have a significant relationship with 
cooperative sequences of relationship management-focused behaviors, although the 
results became marginal (βimmediate = 0.26, p < 0.10; βdelayed = 0.27, p < 0.10). Next, we 
examined the relationship between dyad maximum overall CQ and each type of 
behavioral sequence at immediate and delayed time lags. Maximum overall CQ did not 
predict any of the strategic sequences at immediate (βidentical = -0.05, p > 0.70; 
βcomplementary= 0.15, p > 0.20; βcooperative = 0.07, p > 0.60) nor delayed time lags (βidentical = 







Chapter 4: Discussion 
In this paper, we argued that there is a fundamental paradox in the culture and 
negotiation literature, where there is a dearth of research addressing the question of what 
predicts intercultural negotiation effectiveness, despite researchers’ long-time recognition 
of the practical importance of this question. We proposed cultural intelligence as a 
promising predictor of intercultural negotiation effectiveness. More specifically, we 
postulated that dyads high in CQ are better equipped with the cognitive, motivational, 
and behavioral skills necessary in overcoming cultural barriers such as clashing schemas 
and metaphors, reduced persistence, and the deciphering and enacting of culturally non-
normative behaviors. As such, we argued that high CQ negotiators will be able to develop 
a shared understanding of the negotiation as a cooperative problem-solving activity, as 
reflected in their strategic sequencing of integrative information behaviors as well as 
cooperative relationship management behaviors, which in turn predict negotiation 
outcomes. Moreover, we expected CQ to predict strategic sequences over and beyond 
other related but distinct constructs including international experience, personality and 
intelligence. 
Overall CQ, Complementary Sequences of Integrative Behaviors, and Joint Profit 
The results of an intercultural negotiation study between Americans and East 
Asians, where CQ and other individual differences were measured one week prior to the 
negotiation partially supported these notions. The most important finding was that 
consistent with our theory, dyad-level CQ predicts immediate complementary sequences 




complementary sequences of integrative behaviors over and beyond international travel 
and living experiences, openness, extraversion, empathy, emotional intelligence, and 
cognitive ability. 
This main finding simultaneously makes contributions to several streams in the 
broader literature. First, it adds to the culture and negotiation literature by showing that 
CQ is a key predictor of the extent to which intercultural negotiators exchange 
information in their search for integrative agreement. Thus, in response to Kray’s (2005) 
earlier suggestion that “negotiation scholars might consider expanding beyond simple 
demonstrations of [cultural] differences…and explore whether awareness of these 
differences makes a difference” (p.159) in influencing the effectiveness of intercultural 
negotiations, we show with CQ that it does indeed make a difference. As such, our study 
begins to address the question of what predicts intercultural negotiation effectiveness, 
which so far has remained a black box in the culture and negotiation literature.  
Second, this study provides additional evidence for the predictive validity of CQ, 
specifically in a negotiation context. The CQ literature thus far has focused mainly on the 
usefulness of CQ predicting outcomes such as adjustment and business performance in 
expatriate management contexts involving samples of expatriates, foreign professionals, 
and international executives. In our study, we show that CQ is also advantageous for 
intercultural negotiation, which involves complex decision-making between two parties 
who both attempt to resolve perceived incompatible goals. Furthermore, by showing that 
CQ predicts intercultural negotiation effectiveness over and beyond other individual 
difference constructs such as international experience, personality, and other types of 




Third, we also make a contribution to the negotiation literature by furthering our 
understanding of the negotiation process which there is little understanding of in the U.S. 
literature and even more so in the cross-cultural literature. By directly examining the 
negotiation process of strategic sequencing of integrative behaviors, we provide an in-
depth, dynamic view of how such a communication pattern mediates the effect of a 
previously unexamined negotiation input, CQ, on joint profit, the negotiation outcome.  
Facet-level CQ, Strategic Sequences, and Outcomes 
Our exploratory analyses also revealed that a different facet of CQ predicts each 
of the three negotiation sequences. First, dyads high in motivational CQ engaged in more 
immediate complementary sequences of integrative behaviors. Although it is reasonable 
to expect that all of the CQ facets would predict complementary sequences based on our 
previous theorizing, it may be that motivational CQ has the strongest predictive power 
because having the underlying motivation in the first place for interacting with people 
from different cultures is more fundamental to cultural adjustment than the adaptive 
thoughts and behaviors that may consequently follow from having high motivational CQ. 
Interestingly, this finding parallels U.S. research on self-efficacy and negotiation, which 
found that having the confidence and anticipation of successful performance in 
integrative bargaining buffer negotiators from negative effects of impasse. For example, 
self-efficacious negotiators were less likely to experience negative emotions and 
perceptions of negotiation counterparts as not being interested in reaching mutually 
beneficial outcomes, which paved the way to more open information exchange 
(O’Connor & Arnold, 2001). Similarly, our finding illustrates that self-efficacy 




sequences of information exchange behaviors in an intercultural context where cultural 
barriers most likely pose stress and frustration upon negotiators. 
Second, we also found that dyads high in behavioral CQ engaged in more 
immediate cooperative sequences of non-task-focused relationship management 
behaviors, which in turn led to relational capital. This finding is comparable to recent 
findings on non-conscious mimicry, or the automatic matching of verbal and non-verbal 
behaviors between interaction partners. Research has shown that the conscious goal of 
getting along with another increases mimicry (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), and that 
mimicry in turn acts as a “social glue” in binding people together and creating 
harmonious relationships (Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). Indeed, there is 
evidence that mimicry increases cooperative behavior (e.g. prosocial helping) and 
enhances liking and rapport (van Baaren, Holland, Kawakami, & van Knippenberg, 
2004). Our finding on behavioral CQ can be interpreted similarly, in that in intercultural 
contexts, negotiators with high behavioral CQ focus their conscious efforts on adapting to 
the other party and can better mimic their verbal and non-verbal behaviors (e.g. use of 
tone, pause, silence, facial expressions, rates of speaking) because of their wider 
repertoire of culturally non-normative behaviors. As such, negotiators with high 
behavioral CQ seemed to have developed greater rapport with their counterparts as 
indicated by their sequencing of relationship management behaviors, which in turn, led to 
high relational capital. 
There were also several unexpected findings in our study. First, although it is 
reasonable to expect motivational CQ to also predict sequences of cooperative 




sequences of integrative behaviors, there were no such significant relationships. Second, 
motivational CQ, which had a positive relationship with complementary integrative 
sequences as mentioned above, did not have a significant relationship with reciprocal 
integrative sequences. One can only speculate as to why such is the case. It may be that 
because of low statistical power due to our small sample size, relationships that actually 
exist are not being detected. Furthermore, regarding the absence of relationship between 
motivational CQ and reciprocal sequences of integrative behaviors in particular, it is 
possible that with reciprocal sequences, the negotiation process is being represented at 
too fine a detail, as matching of behaviors were counted at the negotiation tactical level. 
In contrast, for complementary sequences, matching of behaviors was counted at the 
strategic level; that is, even if two different tactics occurred in sequence, they were 
counted as a complementary sequence as long as they belonged to the same strategic 
cluster of integrative information behaviors. Thus, the looser structure of complementary 
sequences may be representing more of a theoretically meaningful construct of 
integrative sequences than reciprocal sequences. Based on this interpretation, although 
there was an additional significant relationship between a specific CQ facet, meta-
cognitive CQ, and reciprocal sequences of integrative behaviors, we remain cautious in 
making theoretical interpretations of this particular relationship. In order to clarify 
relationships among specific facets of CQ and strategic sequences, future research is 
needed where these relationships are tested with larger sample sizes, with strategic 
sequences being measured at varying levels of abstraction.  
Finally, while we hypothesized that sequences of integrative behaviors would lead 




behaviors would also lead to both joint profit and relational capital, we did not find such 
a pattern. We found that sequences of integrative behaviors only predicted joint profit, 
whereas sequences of cooperative relationship management behaviors only predicted 
relational capital. This finding attests to the recent arguments raised by researchers on the 
importance of distinguishing objective and subjective negotiation criteria. Developing 
and maintaining a shared understanding of the negotiation as a cooperative problem-
solving activity where negotiators exchange information does not necessarily guarantee a 
very high quality relationship consisting of mutual liking, trust, understanding, and 
commitment to a future relationship in intercultural contexts. In parallel, developing and 
maintaining sequences of non-task-focused miscellaneous comments that maintain a 
cooperative relationship does not necessarily lead to obtaining high joint profit.  
Dyad Composition 
 In terms of dyad composition, the pattern of significant results for dyad 
mean CQ and dyad minimum CQ (at the overall level) predicting strategic sequences at 
both immediate and delayed time lags looked almost identical, whereas dyad maximum 
CQ did not have any significant associations with any of the sequences. The results 
suggest that the negotiator with the lower CQ level has more of an impact on the extent to 
which the dyad engages in complementary sequences of integrative behaviors than the 
negotiator with the higher CQ level. This makes sense given the conjunctive nature of the 
task (Steiner, 1972); that is, sequencing integrative behaviors is a joint task that requires 
the contributions of both negotiators. Thus, the dyad-level performance can only be as 
good as its “weakest link”; even if one negotiator within the dyad has high CQ and tries 




the other negotiator does not reciprocate integrative behaviors, overall, the dyad still 
suffers as a result. In sum, it is not enough to just have one high CQ negotiator, the ability 
level of the low CQ negotiator influences the extent to which the dyad engages in 
integrative sequencing. 
Practical Implications 
 The practical implication of our research is that CQ is a key predictor of 
intercultural negotiation effectiveness on which individuals can be selected and/ or 
trained. Given that negotiation is a ubiquitous pattern of social interaction, and that 
globalization is increasingly infiltrating many parts of the world, it is likely that the 
selection and training of CQ will be advantageous for intercultural negotiations not only 
organizational contexts (e.g. inter-organizational relations, manager-subordinate 
relations, industrial relations), but also in other areas such as international relations (Pruitt 
& Carnevale, 1993). For example, Triandis (1994) anecdotally argued that in the early 
1990s just before the Gulf War, one of the problems in the intercultural negotiations 
between former secretary of state James Baker and former foreign minister of Iraq, Tariq 
Aziz, was that Baker’s emotional style of being calm and not raising his voice was 
misattributed by Aziz to mean that Americans were not serious about using military force 
in Iraq. Thus, even in political arena among diplomats, it stands to reason that training 
CQ would lead to better intercultural negotiation outcomes. 
 Specifically in organizational contexts, managers can rely on a number of ways to 
assess overall CQ for selection or training, in addition to self-report measures (Earley & 
Ang, 2003). For example, direct observations of intercultural negotiators allow assessors 




as they occur in real-time. Furthermore, by using cultural assimilators, assessors can 
present problematic intercultural negotiations between actors and have participants make 
correct attributions and interpretations of the actors’ behaviors. In addition to overall CQ, 
managers can also train specific facets of CQ as it applies to intercultural negotiations. 
For example, meta-cognitive CQ can be increased through cognitive behavior 
modification, a technique that raises conscious awareness of one’s automaticity of 
thoughts and behaviors (CBM; Mahoney, 1974; Meichenbaum, 1974), motivational CQ 
can be increased through goal-setting (Locke & Latham, 1990), cognitive CQ can be 
increased by reading about other cultures or talking to past negotiators with intercultural 
experience, and finally, behavioral CQ can be acquired through behavior change 
principles such as identifying antecedents and consequences of one’s own culture-
specific negotiation behaviors (Westmacott & Cameron, 1981). 
Limitations and Future Research 
 All research methods have limitations (McGrath, Martin, & Kulka, 1982), and 
this study is no exception. We studied one sample, students, with one methodology, lab-
based negotiation simulation. Therefore, it is necessary to exercise caution in applying 
our results. However, we are hopeful that our findings will generalize to intercultural 
negotiators in organizational and even political settings for two reasons. First, the 
majority of our students consisted of older graduate students who most likely can relate to 
real-world experiences such as negotiation. Second, given that culture has been found to 
pervasively influence behavior in a wide variety of settings (Markus, Kitayama, & 
Heiman, 1997), it stands to reason that the extent to which individuals are intelligent 




intercultural settings. In addition, while we are optimistic about our results, we used a 
self-report measure of CQ given the methodological infancy of the construct. However, 
given the label of “cultural intelligence” and the conceptualization of the construct as an 
ability, we realize the necessity for future research to measure CQ with other, more 
objective methods to provide converging evidence for the predictive power of CQ on 
intercultural negotiation effectiveness. Finally, our study had low statistical power due to 
a small sample size. Nonetheless, we found some significant effects despite a 
conservative test; therefore, we expect even stronger results should future research 
replicate our study with larger sample sizes. 
 There are several fruitful avenues for future research. It would be interesting to 
move beyond the negotiation process of strategic sequencing which focuses on 
negotiators’ shared understanding of the task at a more micro level, to negotiation phases, 
which examines intercultural negotiators’ synchronization of behaviors at a more 
aggregate level. Using a technique called phase mapping (Poole, 1983; Poole & Roth, 
1989), researchers can identify what kind of phases emerge specifically in intercultural 
contexts, and how they differ between high CQ and low CQ dyads. For example, high 
CQ negotiators may be able to develop and transition through clearly demarcated, 
functional negotiation phases at a steady pace as they become highly synchronized with 
each other and move towards resolution, whereas low CQ negotiators may remain 
disorganized and disintegrated throughout the negotiation, leading eventually to 
suboptimal outcomes.  
 Furthermore, it would be fascinating to examine the “dark side” of CQ. That is, 




making where negotiators cultivate relationships in order to reach agreement. In contrast, 
negotiations can also take place in more competitive contexts such as disputing in which 
negotiators’ relationships are dissolving from rejected claims and negative emotions 
(Gelfand, Brett, Imai, Tsai, & Huang, 2006). Thus, it would be interesting to see how CQ 
manifests itself in such non-cooperative contexts. For example, do high CQ individuals 
take advantage of their extensive cultural knowledge and behavioral flexibility to try to 
deceive low CQ individuals? Or, does CQ always entail a cooperative, global-minded 
value system which would then suggest that CQ is a liability in competitive contexts? 
 Additionally, future research can integrate CQ with the negotiation literature on 
cognitive biases. In our study, we did not directly examine how CQ may influence 
negotiators’ underlying psychological mechanisms. Yet, given that high CQ individuals 
should be able to question their own cultural assumptions, it would not be surprising if 
CQ buffers negotiators from culture-specific cognitive biases (e.g. fixed-pie bias, 
fundamental attribution error, self-serving assessments of fairness) that are prevalent in 
competitive, individualistic cultures such as the U.S (see Gelfand & Dyer, 2002 for 
review). It would be useful to examine if intercultural negotiators’ mutual reduction in 
such culture-specific cognitive biases mediate the relationship between CQ and 
synchronization of behaviors.  
 Finally, the vast majority of intercultural negotiation studies have focused on 
interactions between Americans and East Asians, and this study is no exception. Future 
research should move beyond examining Pacific Rim cultures to see if the positive 
effects of CQ on intercultural negotiation effectiveness generalize to U.S. negotiations 




there are virtually no negotiation studies involving Middle Eastern cultures. Given that 
there are large cultural differences between the U.S. and the Middle East on a wide 
variety of value dimensions (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004), it is 
likely that there are many sources of cultural barriers that must be overcome in U.S.—
Middle Eastern intercultural negotiations.  
Conclusion 
 This research expands the dominant paradigm in the culture and negotiation 
literature by moving beyond cross-cultural comparisons of negotiation behaviors to 
directly examining negotiation behaviors as they occur in intercultural contexts. This 
study illustrates that CQ is a key predictor of intercultural negotiation effectiveness, as 
dyads high in CQ were found to engage in more strategic sequencing of integrative 
behaviors, which in turn led to high joint outcomes. Practically speaking, managers 
should select and/or train CQ in individuals to maximize the chances of optimal 
agreements in intercultural negotiations. Future research, such as examining the effects of 
CQ on broader negotiation processes such as phases, the role of CQ in competitive 
contexts such as disputing, and the effects of CQ on psychological mechanisms such as 
cognitive biases, would help build a more comprehensive theory of cultural intelligence 
































































States preference within a 
single issue 
 
States priority information 
across two or more issues 
 
Asks a question about 
other’s issue preference 
 
Asks a question about 
other’s priority across two or 
more issues 
 





Notes similarity in issue 
preference or priority 
 
Suggests compromise or 
willingness to concede 
 
Suggests package tradeoff of 
two or more issues 
 
Expresses positive reaction 
to issues 
 





“I would like to open at 6:30am.” 
 
 
“For me, renovation cost is the big thing.” 
 
 
“What is your opinion on temperature?” 
 
 




“I really really understand that you need a 
colder temperature due to your wines 
whereas I need a higher temperature 
because of my breakfast items.” 
 
“Both of us want 40% for me and 60% for 
you.” 
 
“I’ll give in a little bit.” 
 
 






“What if we do 67 on temperature and 8:30 
for hours of operation?” 
 
“If I give you that for temperature, I’ll need 




















Comments that validate 
other’s perspective 
 
“I’m looking forward to collaborating with 
you!” 
 
“If I don’t have a business, you don’t have a 
business.” 
 


















































through emotional appeals 
 
States fact that support 
substantiation but does not 
stand as a substantiation on 
its own 
 
Asks question about other’s 
substantiation 
 
States bottom line 
 
Asks for other’s bottom line 
 
 
Notes issue difference 
 
Expresses negative reaction 
 
Makes single-issue offer 
 
 
“We really need to project an image of 
luxury to target our upper crust customers.” 
 
“I really need your support and 
understanding on temperature.” 
 





“People don’t buy wine in the summer?” 
 
 
“I can’t go any lower than 71 degrees.” 
 
“What’s the coldest temperature you can 
accept?” 
 





























Makes statements of power 
over other 
 
Makes statements of 
rights/fairness 
 
“You’re being really unreasonable.” 
 
 
“I can go find another partner if you’re not 
willing to cooperate a little.” 
 
“I’m selling all the food and all you’re 
selling are drinks.” 
 

































Asks clarification questions 
 
Shows insight of other  
 
 
Notes general differences 
 
 
Discusses one issue 
 
 
“Yeah, okay, we have some things to 
discuss.” 
 
“Can you say that again?” 
 
“So it’s important to you to have a high 
temperature.” 
 
“On most issues, we have opposite 
preferences.” 
 


























Suggests to move on 
 
Suggests other procedure 
 
Makes time check 
 
Suggests creative solution 
that is out of bounds from 
role instructions 
 
Makes off-task statements 
“Maybe we should go on to other issues.” 
 
“Why don’t we each take turns.” 
 
“We have five minutes left.” 
 
“I’ll open my part of the store at 6:30 and 
you can open yours at 10:30.” 
 
 







































Regression Results for Analyses Looking at Full Negotiation 
 
Summary of Regression Analysis for CQ Predicting Reciprocal Sequences of Integrative Information 
Behaviors in Full Negotiation (N =65) 















0.01 0.01 .12 0.01 0.01 .23+ 
Living 
Experience 










































































Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = -0.01; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = -0.01 
 
 
Summary of Regression Analysis for CQ Predicting Complementary Sequences of Integrative Information 
Behaviors in Full Negotiation (N =65) 















0.02 0.01 .34* 0.01 0.01 .18 
Living 
Experience 
0.00 0.00 -.01 0.00 0.00 .02 
 
Openness 




























































Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.07; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = -0.05 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 






Summary of Regression Analysis for CQ Predicting Cooperative Sequences of Relationship Management 
Behaviors in Full Negotiation (N =65) 















-0.01 0.01 -.16 -0.01 0.01 -.22+ 
Living 
Experience 
-0.00 0.00 -0.28* -0.00 0.00 -.25+ 
 
Openness 




























































Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate =0.04; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = 0.08 
 
 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Reciprocal, Complementary, and Cooperative Sequences in Full 
Negotiation Predicting Joint Gain (N =65) 





























49.16 24.34 .25* 41.70 26.86 .21 
Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.13; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = 0.03 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 












Summary of Regression Analysis for Reciprocity of Identical, Complementary, and Cooperative Behaviors 
in Full Negotiation Predicting Relational Capital (N =65) 





























0.23 0.16 .19 0.24 0.16 0.19 
Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.01; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = 0.06 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 































Cultural Intelligence Scale (Ang et al., 2004) 
 
Meta-cognitive 
1. I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I use when interacting with people with different cultural 
backgrounds. 
2. I am conscious of the cultural knowledge I apply to cross-cultural interactions. 
3. I adjust my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from a culture that is unfamiliar to me. 
4. I check the accuracy of my cultural knowledge as I interact with people from  
      different cultures. 
 
Cognitive 
5.   I know the legal and economic systems of other cultures. 
6.   I know the religious beliefs of other cultures. 
7.   I know the marriage systems of other cultures. 
8.   I know the arts and crafts of other cultures. 
9.   I know the rules (e.g., grammar) of other languages. 
10. I know the rules for expressing non-verbal behaviors in other cultures. 
 
Motivational 
11. I enjoy interacting with people from different cultures. 
12. I enjoy living in cultures that are unfamiliar to me. 
13. I am confident that I can socialize with locals in a culture that is unfamiliar to me. 
14. I am confident that I can get accustomed to the shopping conditions in a different  
      culture. 
15. I am sure I can deal with the stresses of adjusting to a culture that is new to me. 
 
Behavioral 
16. I change my verbal behavior (e.g., accent, tone) when a cross-cultural interaction requires it. 
17. I change my non-verbal behavior when a cross-cultural situation requires it. 
18. I use pause and silence differently to suit different cross-cultural situations. 
19. I vary the rate of my speaking when a cross-cultural situation requires it. 



















Relational Capital Scale 
 
1. My partner and I liked each other. 
2. I felt as though my partner and I developed mutual liking for each other. 
3. My partner and I did not like each other. 
4. My partner and I both find each other to be pleasant individuals. 
5. I felt that my negotiation partner and I had a mutual understanding of each other’s needs. 
6. My partner and I could accurately describe each other’s preferences and priorities of the negotiation issues. 
7. I felt as though my partner and I gained mutual knowledge of each other’s positions during the negotiation. 
8. My partner and I developed trust for each other. 
9. My partner and I would not deceive each other. 
10. My partner and I can rely on each other to fulfill promises. 
11. I am confident that my partner and I are both committed to the 
relationship we developed together. 

































 1 Because sequences of behavior across the two negotiators were of primary interest in this study, 
when multiple codes at the thought-unit level occurred within a negotiator’s speaking turn, it was necessary 
to eliminate less substantial behaviors and assign one dominant code at the speaking-turn level. In order to 
achieve a certain level of objectivity in deciding what code was dominant in the speaking turn, the first and 
second authors went through a number of transcripts to achieve collective agreement on a dominance 
scheme, similar to one used in previous research (Weingart, Bennett, Brett, 1993; Weingart, Prietula, & 
Hyder 1999). Multi-issue offers were considered more dominant than substantiations that followed, 
statements about issue preferences were considered more substantial than substantiations that followed, and 
neutral miscellaneous statements were considered less substantial than all other codes. 
2 For cognitive ability, preliminary analyses at the individual level indicated that East Asians 
scored significantly lower than Americans (M East Asian = 24.67, sd = 4.57; M American = 31.49, SD = 4.75; t 
(128) = -8.35, p < 0.01), most likely because the Wonderlic requires knowledge of difficult English 
proverbs and idioms. To deal with this issue, raw scores were standardized into Z scores within each 
cultural group to determine one’s relative standing in cognitive ability within his or her racial group. Z 























Negotiator Payoff Schedule 
 
Payoff Schedule for Grocery Shop Owner 
 























































































Payoff Schedule for Wine Shop Owner 
 




























































































Descriptive Statistics and Inter-correlations for Dyad-Level Measures 
 
Variable M SD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 18.00 19.00 20.00 21.00
1. Sex 1.42 0.53 -
2. Education 1.75 0.43 .11 -
3. Mean Age 26.43 4.72 .23 .60** -
4. Negotiation Experience 1.29 0.46 .27** .21 .19 -
5. East Asian Time in U.S. 32.93 19.94 .15 -.11 -.02 -.06 -
6. Overall CQ 5.07 0.41 -.10 .02 -.09 .07 .00 -
7. International Travel Experience 7.14 8.54 -.17 .13 .19 .26** -.17 .15 -
8. International Living Experience 81.62 62.25 .01 -.05 -.05 -.11 .54** .22 .11 -
9. Openness 3.79 0.39 .17 .08 .18 .30** .11 .38** .16 .12 -
10. Extraversion 3.24 0.55 -.11 .01 .01 -.03 .13 .41** .21 .31** .54** -
11. Empathy 2.45 0.26 -.36** -.18 -.20 .03 .04 .34** .14 .15 .35** .20 -
12. Emotional Intelligence 3.78 0.32 -.07 .04 -.11 .11 .02 .39** -.06 .08 .51** .44** .46** -
13. Cognitive Ability 0.02 0.67 .17 .05 .04 .01 .15 .01 .07 .18 .27** .18 -.13 -.01 -
14. Immediate Reciprocal + 0.06 0.04 .05 .00 .08 .11 -.14 .17 .14 .06 .32** .20 .03 .15 .11 -
15. Delayed Reciprocal + 0.05 0.04 .12 -.02 -.02 .13 -.08 .16 .10 .07 .20 -.07 -.08 .13 .14 .61** -
16. Immediate Complementary + 0.14 0.08 .14 .07 -.02 .19 -.03 .32** .18 -.14 .20 .03 .10 .25** -.06 .25** .40** -
17. Delayed Complementary + 0.13 0.08 .11 -.13 -.03 .14 -.03 .31** .06 -.04 .18 .07 .06 .11 -.07 .45** .30** .71** -
18. Immediate Relationship + 0.02 0.03 -.11 -.04 -.09 -.24 .09 .16 -.03 -.05 -.12 .02 .06 .05 .06 -.02 -.07 .06 .20 -
19. Delayed Relationship + 0.01 0.02 -.09 -.14 -.19 -.18 .18 .13 .02 .01 -.21 .01 .01 -.06 .02 .04 .01 .03 .12 .81** -
20. Joint Profit 1337.74 105.03 .35** .10 .22 .02 .08 -.04 .19 .07 -.01 .05 -.12 -.06 .30** .11 .16 .31** .14 .11 .09 -
21. Relational Capital 5.27 0.68 -.05 .13 -.02 .08 .03 .00 .07 -.21 -.01 .00 .15 .11 .03 .13 -.04 .07 .10 .42** .34** .16 -





Summary of Regression Analysis for CQ Predicting Reciprocal Sequences of Integrative 
Information Behaviors  
































































































Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.00; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = 0.09 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 



















Summary of Regression Analysis for CQ Predicting Complementary Sequences of 
Integrative Information Behaviors 
































































































Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.12; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = 0.01 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 





















Summary of Regression Analysis for CQ Predicting Cooperative Sequences of 
Relationship Management Behaviors 
































































































Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = -0.02; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = -0.01 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 





















Summary of Regression Analysis for Reciprocal, Complementary, and Cooperative 
Sequences Predicting Joint Profit 






























26.56 28.44 .12 26.59 36.48 .09 
 
Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.06; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = -0.01 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 

























Summary of Regression Analysis for Reciprocal, Complementary, and Cooperative 
Behaviors Predicting Relational Capital 






























0.61 0.17 .42** 0.59 0.22 .33** 
 
Note. Adjusted R2 Immediate = 0.15; Adjusted R
2 
Delayed = 0.08 
+ p < .10 
* p < .05 
































































































Regression Coefficients for Hypothesized Relationships among CQ, Immediate 































































































































































Simplified Path Model: Relationship among CQ, Immediate Complementary Sequences 








































































































Simplified Path Model: Relationship among Meta-cognitive CQ, Motivational CQ, 
Behavioral CQ, Immediate Reciprocal Sequences of Integrative Information Behaviors, 
Immediate Complementary Sequences of Integrative Information Behaviors, Immediate 
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